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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the intersection between human rights and security assistance in 
Mauritania. In American security assistance broadly, and within the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership specifically, there has been an over-securitization of “whole 
of government” counterterrorism policy. While the United States recognizes the need to 
address the social, economic, and political roots of extremism, it has failed to do so in 
practice. If the United States continues to support Mauritania with conventional security 
assistance but does not tackle the root causes of extremism, it will ultimately fail in 
fighting terrorism in the Sahel. In order to succeed, the U.S. government must give 
greater authority to the Department of State and USAID, create greater accountability for 
human rights within the Department of Defense, and improve interagency coordination. 
In the long term, the U.S. government must change its paradigm regarding the 
relationship between security and human rights. 
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Introduction 
Less than two weeks after I interviewed the Vice President of the Initiative for the 
Resurgent Abolitionist Movement (IRA), Brahim Bilal Ramdhane, the Mauritanian 
government imprisoned him and the Initiative’s president, Biram Dah Abeid. This 
treatment is common in Mauritania, a country that routinely oppresses civil society, 
persecutes political opposition, and engages in egregious abuses of human rights. 
Mauritania is also a recipient of American security assistance targeted at countering 
violent extremist organizations (VEO) in the Sahel, the region Mauritania shares with 
Mali, Burkina Faso and parts of Chad, Eritrea, Nigeria, Niger, South Sudan, Sudan, and 
Algeria. The humanitarian and political conditions in Mauritania make its population 
highly susceptible to radicalization. If Mauritania’s social, economic, and humanitarian 
issues continue, Mauritania could face the same internal conflict and chaos as Mali. The 
United States provides security assistance to avoid such an outcome, among other things. 
However, the United States does not effectively counter the human rights abuses in the 
country that create the environment for such instability. Instead, U.S. security assistance 
supports the very government responsible for such abuses. 
While the United States recognizes that it must consider these developmental, 
economic, and humanitarian factors in its counterterrorism efforts, it has not effectively 
done so in Mauritania. Instead, the government has overemphasized security efforts in the 
country without giving due consideration to the impact of Mauritania’s severe human 
rights abuses, inequality, and poor governance. To more effectively prevent and combat 
terrorism in the region, the United States must better prioritize human rights within its 
counterterrorism policies, both in its support of the Mauritanian military and through its 
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“whole of government” efforts through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP).   
 For Brahim and other Mauritanians trying to improve the human rights conditions 
in their country, the United States is a lot of talk with little action: 
I think that they come to listen to us. But I have not seen the impact they 
have on the Mauritanian authority. The power in Mauritania has not 
changed…They do not put pressure. I do not see the pressure of the 
Americans on the Mauritanian government. Because the Mauritanian 
government is very weak. If the Americans put pressure on Mauritania, 
they are going to change things. But they have not applied that pressure.1 
 
This project begins with an account of the human rights abuses, inequality, and 
corruption in Mauritania and how they contribute to extremism in the country. It 
continues with a review of American security assistance to Mauritania and details how 
this security assistance has failed to address these underlying issues. Finally, it provides 
brief recommendations as to how the United States can better incorporate human rights 
into its security policy as a whole and in Mauritania, specifically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Brahim Bilal Abeid (Vice President of IRA) in discussion with the author, November  3, 2014. Author’s 
translation.  
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Literature Review 
It has become increasingly clear that combatting violent extremism requires more 
than military solutions. This is also true for Mauritania, a key US partner in curbing 
terrorism in the Sahel. Anouar Boukhars, a nonresident scholar in the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program, has worked extensively on 
the internal drivers of insecurity in Mauritania. He emphasizes that Mauritania’s 
disenfranchisement of its youth and unequal distribution of wealth and power among its 
ethnic groups has led to increased radicalization of its population.2 In order for 
Mauritania to have a truly stable foundation, the country must move towards stronger, 
more transparent institutions. It will also have to actively place members of its Haratin 
population in positions of power and work towards more equitable social and economic 
development. Boukhars emphasizes that foreign nations supporting Mauritania in the war 
on terror must predicate their aid on the creation of more accountable and transparent 
institutions. If foreign powers only bolster Mauritania’s “coercive apparatus,” they will 
fail to successfully counter terrorism in the country and the region as a whole.3     
The partnership with Mauritania is part of the U.S.’s post-9/11 expansion of 
counterterrorism efforts into countries “on the periphery.” The peripheral states are safe 
havens for terrorist organizations that do not pose direct threats to the United States.4 
Maria Ryan of the University of Nottingham highlights that fighting terrorism in the 
periphery must focus primarily on the instability and poor governance that allows these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Anouar Boukhars, “Mauritania’s Precarious Stability and Islamist Undercurrent,” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, February 2016, 1, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP266_Boukhars_Final.pdf.  
3 Boukhars, “Mauritania’s Precarious Stability and Islamist Undercurrent,” February 2016, 2. 
4 Maria Ryan, “‘War in countries we are not at war with’: The ‘war on terror’ on the periphery from Bush 
to Obama,” International Politics 48, no. 2 (2011): 366. 
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groups to survive.5 Ryan emphasizes that the United States has gone beyond the 
conventional counterterrorism measures to “focus on winning hearts and minds and 
diminishing the conditions that might breed terrorism” in periphery nations.6 U.S.-
sponsored public works projects and humanitarian assistance as well as pro-American 
press releases promote a positive view of the United States within these nations.7 Ryan 
concludes by emphasizing that the United States should focus on development in these 
nations rather than providing them with security assistance. 
Yet, the challenge the US faces is two-fold: it does not have the will, the right, or 
the capacity to rewrite Mauritania’s culture. While the United States is attempting to 
assist Mauritania in improving its human rights and development, the U.S. government is 
structured in such a way that privileges short-term military fixes over long-term social 
and economic solutions.  
To the first point, Hans Morgenthau points out that, in addition to using morality 
as cover for their own actions, states often assume they hold the moral high ground, to 
which they believe other countries must conform.8 This assumption is dangerous, as all 
“human rights as perceived by individuals are inevitably filtered through historic and 
social circumstances.”9 Morgenthau does not see one nation as obliged or able to 
completely reform another even with “the best intentions and the most extensive 
commitment of resources.”10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ryan, 381. 
6 Ryan, 372.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (United States: McGraw Hill, 1985),  246.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 107. 
 
 
9 
 
Hedley Bull picks up on these points in his book The Anarchical Society, in which 
he notes that when undertaking human rights in any global or even national context, 
“justice is a term than can ultimately be given only some kind of private or subjective 
definition.”11 Bull gives three core definitions of justice: seeking the equal dispersal and 
application of rights within society and international relations, seeking equal application 
of the law, seeking application and creation of rights proportional to the needs of 
different communities and, finally, engaging in bargaining and communication to decide 
upon the distribution of rights and burdens within society.12 Within these definitions, Bull 
clarifies that justice belongs both to states (sovereignty) and people within states 
(universality). Policies that seek to protect the rights of individuals and maintain justice at 
the individual level can conflict with justice at the interstate level, leading to disorder in 
international relations.13 
Bull remarks that negotiations and bargains driven first and foremost by the self-
interest of the respective states shape international relations.14 To fully recognize human 
rights at the individual level would be to let go of peace and security as the main priority 
of states. As a result, all states regardless of their commitment to human rights will 
support an international regime that maintains stability over one that fights for equal 
rights for all, even if that means supporting those who continuously suppress human 
rights.15 In practice, there is a direct conflict between the institutions that protect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 75. 
12 Ibid, 76-77.  
13 Ibid, 80. 
14 Ibid, 82. 
15 Ibid, 85.  
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international order and international efforts to prioritize human rights. In the end, 
international order consistently remains the priority of states.16 
The problem with the foregoing arguments is that sometimes promoting human 
rights actually can protect security interests, both within states and internationally. A state 
providing security assistance to another may thus need to address issues of human rights 
in its own security interests and in its partner’s.  In Counterinsurgency in Crisis, David 
Ucko and Robert Egnell specify that training foreign militaries in counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism must include human rights elements. Military training is only effective 
if the foreign militaries maintain their skills, remain accountable to their institutions, and 
use their skills in ways that are not corrupt or abusive.17 This requires the buy-in of 
military and political leadership. As a result, the country training the foreign militaries 
must also promote good governance, accountability, and human rights reforms within the 
host government.18 If the government continues human rights abuses, so will the military. 
This will undermine counterinsurgency efforts and military training.  
In Humanitarian Intervention, Robert Keohane highlights that having a military 
presence in a country with a disenfranchised population will lead to resentment towards 
the nation providing assistance. The United States and other nations providing assistance 
can mitigate this resentment by providing humanitarian support and promoting human 
rights. Resentful populations in fragile states are more likely to breed extremist groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid, 89. 
17 David Ucko and Robert Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2013), 160.  
18 Ibid.  
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that target the states providing assistance to the current regime.19 In the same collection, 
Michael Ignatieff highlights the need for effective governance and rule of law in 
strengthening states. Specifically in regards to fragile or failed states, the state cannot be 
rebuilt with the same structures that weakened it.20 Fragile institutions and weak states 
will only support the proliferation of terrorist groups and instability.21 In strengthening 
state institutions, foreign actors must engage with local populations, as local populations 
must buy into the legitimacy of government institutions and leadership in order for the 
state to remain stable.22    
As Ryan points out, this is something the United States has begun to understand. 
Lesley Ann Warner has done significant work on counterterrorism partnerships in Africa, 
specifically looking at holistic strategies like the TSCTP. Warner conducted research and 
interviews with top counterterrorism professionals in both the United States and Africa, 
focusing specifically on those working in justice, military capacity building, vocational 
training, community engagement, public diplomacy, and law enforcement.23 In her 
review of countering violent extremism through the TSCTP, she notes that there are 
many factors that contribute to the rise of violent extremism including unemployment, 
corruption, and government repression.24  Human rights violations and human insecurity 
specifically lead to more people, particularly youth, entering terrorist organizations.25 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Robert Keohane, “Political Authority After Intervention,” in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. J. L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 296. 
20 Michael Ignatieff, “State Failure and Nation Building,” in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. J. L. Holzgrefe 
and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),  307.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid, 318-319. 
23 Lesley Ann Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: Building Partner Capacity to 
Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” The Center for Complex Operations (March 2014): 14.  
24 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,” 20.  
25 Ibid.  
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recognition of these factors, the United States, the European Union, and their 
international partners have all attempted capacity-building operations in the Sahel and 
other volatile regions. 
Returning to the second point, even when the U.S. decides that it is in its national 
interest to promote human rights as a means of combating terrorism, its own structures 
make doing so nearly impossible. Thus, while the American government has incorporated 
some human rights and governance into its counterterrorism strategy, it has also 
increasingly militarized development and human rights assistance. In Mission Revolution, 
Jennifer Taw argues that when the Department of Defense (DOD) implements a 
development program, DOD focuses only on how that program impacts security interests 
in the short term.26 This undermines long term development and so undermines stability 
and security in the long term. The inequality between State and DOD worsens this 
problem, with Congress increasingly giving DOD jurisdiction over programs while 
limiting the influence of State and USAID. 27 In order to maintain stability in countries 
with terrorist threats, the United States must reframe its outlook on the relationship 
between human rights, security, and development.  
Similarly, Joanna Spear highlights the problem of DOD dominance in interagency 
programs, specifically in counterterrorism. USAID, State, and DOD agendas conflict in 
American counterterrorism programs encompassing the 3Ds of diplomacy, defense, and 
development. Given DOD’s expansive budget and influence, its agenda is most likely to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Jennifer Taw, Mission Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 177.  
27 Taw, 173. 
 
 
13 
 
be implemented.28 While USAID and State have been able to retake some of their 
programming and influence in recent years, DOD still controls the majority of 
programming in counterterrorism partnerships, even when those efforts are intended to be 
whole of government.29 Development programs implemented by DOD are typically 
unsustainable and so undermine the goal of whole of government counterterrorism 
programs.30 
Hans Morgenthau argues that states generally act in their own interests, but 
conceal their true motives: “What is actually aspiration for power, then, appears to be 
something different, something that is in harmony with the demands of reason, morality, 
and justice.”31 While Morgenthau acknowledges that states value human rights, 
respecting “absolute moral” principles, he believes they will sacrifice such principles if 
they conflict with a “higher purpose such as the national interest.”32 This paper argues 
that human rights and the national interest actually intersect and that though there are 
significant practical challenges in human rights promotion, long term security interests 
depend upon it. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Joanna Spear, “The Militarization of United States Foreign Aid,” in The Securitization of Foreign Aid, 
ed. Stephen Brown and Jorn Gravingholt (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 23.  
29 Joanna Spear, “The Militarization of United States Foreign Aid, 29.  
30 Ibid, 33.  
31 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 219. 
32 Ibid, 228.  
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Chapter 1: Mauritanian Domestic Context 
	  
Introduction to Mauritania 
Mauritania is a highly underdeveloped nation located in Northwest Africa, 
bordered by Senegal in the South, Morocco, Western Sahara, and Algeria in the North, 
and Mali in the East. While Mauritania is fairly large for a sub-Saharan African nation, it 
is home to only 3.97 million people.33 A former French colony, Mauritania’s mix of 
French, Arab, and African historical influences is represented in its society. Mauritania is 
located in the Sahel, a strip of land stretching between North Africa and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Historically, the Sahel has been where the Arab cultures of the North and the 
African cultures of the South blend together; today that occurs within the Sahelien 
nations of Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso.34 These states share 
similar geography and levels of development, all falling in the lowest level of the Human 
Development Index.35 In addition, these states share problems of social conflict rooted in 
race, tribal affiliation, and extremism (with Senegal remaining a large exception).  
Mauritania’s economy relies primarily on the exploitation of iron ore and other 
minerals (gypsum, copper, phosphate, diamond, and gold) as well as fishing off its 
coast.36 Its economy is currently growing at a rate of 5% per year; however, the economy 
also suffers from severe institutional weakness, fragile economic growth, and a large 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 “Mauritania,” World Bank, accessed April 2, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/mauritania.  
34 Some sources also include Sudan and South Sudan in the Sahel. 
35 “Human Development Reports,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed December 1, 2015, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI.  
36 “Mauritania,” CIA World Factbook, accessed November 30, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mr.html.  
 
 
15 
 
trade deficit.37 Iron ore makes up 46% of Mauritania’s exports followed by fish (16%) 
and gold (11%). China, France, Spain, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates are 
Mauritania’s top trading partners. Its land is largely dry and barren, making it difficult for 
many to survive on subsistence farming. Although over fifty percent of the nation relies 
on agriculture and livestock for income, an increasingly large percentage of nomads and 
subsistence farmers have had to relocate to the cities as a result of recurring drought.38 
After independence in 1960, Mauritania became an Islamic Republic, as its 
population is approximately 99% Muslim (government statistics claim 100%). Given the 
nation’s colonial history and geographic location, Mauritania continuously struggles with 
its national identity. For example, the nation is regulated by a mix of French and Islamic 
civil law. Mauritanian law draws on the Constitution, Sharia law, and governmental 
legislation in its judicial decisions.39 While Arabic (Hassaniya dialect) has now become 
the country’s official and national language, French remains Mauritania’s administrative 
language and Pulaar, Soninke, and Wolof all remain national tribal languages. In practice, 
it is often difficult for groups to find a common language, most often choosing to 
communicate in either Hassaniya or French.40 
As a result of Mauritania’s geographic placement between majority-Arab North 
Africa and majority-African sub-Saharan Africa, its population is largely divided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Mauritania Country Brief,” International Trade Center, accessed December 1, 2015, 
http://www.intracen.org/country/mauritania/.  
38 “Mauritania,” CIA World Factbook, accessed November 30, 2015.  
39 Zelezeck Nguimatsa Serge, “Researching the Legal System and Laws of the Islamic Republic of 
Mauritania,” Hauser Global Law School Program, August 2009, 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Mauritania.html#sourcesoflaws.   
40 Afred G. Gerteiny, “Mauritania,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed November 10, 2015, 
http://www.britannica.com/place/Mauritania.  
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between the Arab and African communities.41 This divide is strengthened by 
Mauritania’s racial caste system, with white Arabs at the very top of the hierarchy, 
followed by black Arabs, black Africans, and Haratin respectively. It is also important to 
understand the unique cultural and racial divides of the Sahel. While black Arabs and the 
Haratin caste are historically African - their ancestors were those enslaved by the Arab 
peoples when the Arab and African societies first met on the Sahel - these two groups 
consider themselves Arab. The Afro-Mauritanian community encompasses those 
belonging to African tribes, particularly the Soninke, Pulaar, and Wolof.  
The White Arabs make up about 20% of the population and yet hold a majority of 
the political power. At the bottom of the caste system are the Haratines, which literally 
translates into “freed slaves.” This translation is misleading since much of the Haratine 
caste in Mauritania remains enslaved today, while those who are free still face significant 
discrimination as a result of their social standing and race.42  The Haratins make up the 
largest ethnic group at 40% of the population.43 Estimates from credible non-
governmental organizations and media outlets estimate the percentage of Mauritanians 
enslaved ranges from 4% to 20%. Even at only 4% of its population enslaved, which 
would be about 155,600 people, Mauritania still has the greatest number of enslaved 
peoples per capita of any nation.4445 Even free Haratin remain politically, socially, and 
economically oppressed.   
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Mauritania officially has a democratic, multiparty system and bicameral 
legislative structure, as established under the 1991 Constitution.46 Nevertheless, the 
Mauritanian government is most often regarded as a dictatorship, with political coups and 
exclusion of political opposition defining Mauritania’s history. Mauritania’s most 
infamous dictator, Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, ruled from 1992 to 2005. His 
dictatorship used torture as a common method for gaining information and silencing 
political prisoners. Known for his systemic abuse of human rights and oppression of civil 
society, Taya is most famous for his expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Afro-
Mauritanians in response to the 1989 border conflict with Senegal.  
In 2005, Colonel Ely Ould Mohahmed Vall of the Mauritanian Army deposed 
Taya in a coup. Vall shocked the international community by swiftly implementing a 
transition to civilian, democratic rule.47 This would be Mauritania’s first truly democratic 
poll.48 Vall invited the U.N. to oversee the elections, and the international community 
hailed the elections as a regional model.49 The new government implemented vital 
reforms including criminalizing slavery, reintegrating Mauritanian refugees in Senegal 
(from the 1989 conflict), addressing government corruption, and increasing the separation 
between the military and the civilian government.50 The last of those reforms threatened 
the military, driving General Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz to stage a coup. While Aziz 
later held elections (in which he ran and won), Mauritania had lost a majority of the 
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reforms implemented under democratically-elected President Sidi Ould Cheikh 
Abdallahi. Aziz is the current president in Mauritania and was recently reelected to a 
second five-year term.  
Currently, Mauritania suffers from government corruption, oppression of civil 
society, and significant abuse of human rights. These factors contribute to the 
radicalization of youth in Mauritania and increase sympathy for violent extremist 
organizations. In order to combat extremism in Mauritania, the American government 
must also combat the human rights abuses and government weakness undermining 
Mauritania’s stability.  
 
Mauritania’s Internal Instability  
Civil-­‐Military	  Relations	  
 A political coup has installed nearly every Mauritanian president. Current 
President Aziz led the coup against democratically-elected President Abdallahi and 
supported the coup against President Taya. The military and the Mauritanian government 
are intertwined, weakening the division between civilian authority and the military. In the 
long term, the military’s control over domestic political power in Mauritania will make it 
impossible to implement democratic mechanisms, anti-corruption reforms, and 
accountability measures within the Mauritanian government.  
Most recently, the lack of division between Mauritania’s civilian government and 
the military led to a coup against Mauritania’s first democratically elected President 
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Abdallahi.51 Soldiers detained Abdallahi after he attempted to dismiss four senior military 
officers, including General Aziz.52 General Aziz officially ousted him in a coup in 
2008.53  The military’s control over domestic affairs was demonstrated in Aziz’s 
comments after taking power: “The armed forces and the security forces will always stay 
with the people to deepen the democracy…It's them who brought the democracy here and 
it's them who have always protected this democracy and they will always preserve it.”54 
The clarification of civil-military relations within the democratic process is 
specifically important in the Sahel. With the continued emphasis on counterterrorism and 
regional instability, the need for clarified civil-military relations has become highly 
salient. In Mali, the military ousted President Touré as they claimed he was not doing 
enough to counter VEOs and rebellious tribal groups.55 President Aziz supported this 
decision, reaffirming his lack of confidence in Mali’s counterterrorism measures and 
affirming the importance of his focus on security.56 By focusing only on the importance 
of conventional security measures in counterterrorism, Aziz increases the perceived 
legitimacy of the military’s influence in domestic policy. Similarly, foreign governments 
inadvertently support this justification by focusing primarily on conventional security in 
their counterterrorism support. In order to change the military’s role in domestic 
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governance, foreign governments must place a greater emphasis on government 
accountability, anti-corruption, and human rights in their counterterrorism support.  
 
Racial Discrimination and Political Exclusion 
The Mauritanian government has historically excluded major political opposition 
from participation in government. This exclusion is based largely upon Mauritania’s 
racial caste system. This ethnic inequality and prejudice has sparked anger and frustration 
within these marginalized groups, specifically among members of the Afro-Mauritanian 
and Haratin communities. These two communities have suffered directly as a result of 
Mauritania’s racist policies and perpetuation of slavery. 
The most significant example of racist policies against the Afro-Mauritanian 
community came under President Taya in 1989. A border war had broken out between 
Senegal and Mauritania, sparked by a small outbreak of violence between Senegalese 
farmers and Mauritanian nomadic herders along the Senegalese river. While the conflict 
was minor, it brought in members of the Mauritanian and Senegalese militaries and 
ignited pre-existing racial tensions between and within Mauritania and Senegal.57 In 
response, racial violence broke out in urban centers in Senegal and Mauritania. In 
Senegal, mobs targeted White Arabs for looking “Mauritanian.” Similarly, Afro-
Mauritanians suffered violent attacks in Mauritania for appearing “Senegalese.” As a 
result of the violence, the Senegalese and Mauritanian governments decided to repatriate 
Mauritanian and Senegalese citizens back to their respective countries. However, the 
Mauritanian government took this decision as an opportunity to expel 30,000 Black 
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Africans, a majority with Mauritanian citizenship, who were considered political 
threats.58 The decision forced these political refugees to remain in Senegal for over 
fifteen years. Finally in 2007, President Abdallahi signed a tripartite agreement to 
repatriate and reintegrate Mauritanians living in Senegal.  
The Haratin group has also become increasingly active in demanding social 
equality and political inclusion.59 In recent years, Haratin activity has driven increased 
action politically and within civil society. The government has met both with greater 
crackdown on leaders of the Haratin movements. Particularly, the government fears that 
the Haratin caste and the Afro-Mauritanian community will band together against the 
White Arab regime. This would pose a significantly greater threat to the regime’s power 
than the Haratin currently pose, specifically as the Afro-Mauritanians and Haratin both 
suffer racial discrimination in Mauritanian society. In 2012, the two groups united in 
protest against Biram Dah Abeid’s arrest for burning Maliki texts of Islamic law.60 
According to Biram, the police told him that his greatest crime had been bringing the two 
groups together in political protest.61  
Despite continued international attention towards slavery in Mauritania, the 
Mauritanian government continues to deny that its existence. In an interview with the 
author, Mohammed Ould El Kory, Director of Communications for TADAMOUN, the 
official human rights branch of the Mauritanian government, remarked that NGOs only 
advocate against slavery for money and power: “Today, there is not a single case of 
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slavery in Mauritania. But…there are organizations that say there is in order to receive 
funds. They say anything. Generally, it’s the people who honestly are not very serious.”62 
In practice, the Mauritanian government cracks down on these organizations, seeing them 
as a political threat.  
Recently, these groups have become more active within Mauritania’s political 
system, with Biram Dah Abeid running as the primary opposition candidate in the June 
2014 presidential elections.63 These elections, however, represented the major problems 
of political exclusion in Mauritania. The Mauritanian government pushed forward with 
the elections despite a breakdown in dialogue between it and the major opposition parties. 
The main opposition parties boycotted the election, calling it an “electoral masquerade,” 
noting that the organizers of the election were biased and that the electoral process was 
flawed, lacking sufficient transparency measures.64 Official statistics report that 56% of 
Mauritanians turned out to vote. Moreover, the election ran smoothly, with no evident 
fraud. Yet Biram Dah Abeid - the most successful opposition candidate - captured only 
9% of the vote.65 President Aziz won the election by a large margin. The elections did 
little to quell ethnic division and conflict.   
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 Despite failing to win the election, Biram Dah Abeid became increasingly popular 
and the government considered his organization – IRA – a real threat to its political 
power. In response, the government has cracked down widely on civil society 
organizations. It has arrested Biram Dah Abeid multiple times, along with the senior staff 
of IRA. Most recently, the government arrested Biram and his vice president under 
counterterrorism laws for “belonging to an illegal organisation, leading an unauthorised 
rally, and violence against the police.”66 Since their arrests, the IRA activists have been 
sentenced to two years in prison.67  
 Counterterrorism, political exclusion, and the oppression of civil society are 
intertwined in Mauritania. The government continues to justify the imprisonment and 
torture of political threats such as the IRA leadership under the guise of security and 
counterterrorism. While the government’s targets have changed as Mauritanian leaders 
co-opt civil organizations into their political regimes, the persecution of civil society 
continues. The marginalized groups that benefit from these civil society organizations 
will be more likely to turn to VEOs to incite political and social change if they do not 
have a mechanism to do so within society.68 In a 2012 report on insecurity in Mauritania, 
Boukhars noted that the only two Mauritanian suicide bombers were Haratin.69 Al Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), he noted, “thrives on manipulating people who are 
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hungry for social justice.”70 Similarly, scholars such as Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim note that 
violent extremist groups use the “pervasive marginality” and social fragmentation of 
oppressed groups in Mauritania to manipulate and recruit disenfranchised Mauritanian 
youth.71  
As the Mauritanian government feels directly threatened by activists and members 
of the Haratin and Afro-Mauritanian ethnic groups, they will likely not implement 
sufficient reforms on their own. In order to effectively counter this threat to instability, 
the United States and other foreign actors assisting Mauritania must push the government 
to implement greater structural reforms to include these groups. In addition, the United 
States should implement initiatives such as the Peace Through Development (PDEV) 
program to empower these communities and foster discussion on issues of political 
participation and ethnic conflict.  
 
Persecution of Islamists 
Islamist parties in Mauritania pose a threat to the Mauritanian government not 
because they are Islamist but because they pose a major political threat. Increasingly, 
Islamist parties have become very popular among Mauritanians, especially Mauritanian 
youth. They threaten the political status quo by increasing political participation and 
challenging the Mauritanian government’s cooperation with the West on 
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counterterrorism.72 Nevertheless, they also strongly condemn Al Qaeda and are vital in 
the de-radicalization of Mauritanian youth.73  
The Mauritanian government only accepts Islamist parties who align themselves 
with the political status quo and who do not pose a significant threat. In the past, Islamist 
popularity and criticism of the government’s policies posed a significant threat. In 
response, Aziz and past presidents used counter-extremism measures to justify excluding 
Islamists from political participation and for targeting political opposition. President 
Taya, Mauritania’s dictator from 1992 to 2005, and Colonel Vall, who deposed President 
Taya, both targeted Islamists as part of their respective counterterrorism strategies. Under 
Taya, it was evident that imprisoning, torturing, and intimidating Islamists, though 
nominally a counterterrorism strategy, served to eliminate Islamist political opposition.74  
The Mauritanian government only minimally accepted Islamist participation in 
politics after the legalization of the main Islamist party and Aziz’s rise to power. When 
President Abdallahi legalized the Islamists’ main political party, the National Rally for 
Reform and Development (Tawassoul), as part of his democratic reforms, this posed a 
significant threat to the power of the military and Mauritanian elite.75 This was a major 
factor leading up to the coup against Aballahi. The Mauritanian government only 
officially accepted Tawassoul once the party supported Aziz after he deposed 
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Abdallahi.76 Since then, however, the party has served as one of the main opposition 
forces in government, boycotting the 2014 elections but winning many seats in 
government in other years.77 If Tawassoul becomes a significant threat to Aziz’s power, it 
may once again face political exclusion and persecution.  
The inclusion of Islamists in politics and civil society is highly important for 
counterterrorism, as these groups provide an outlet for moderate discussion of Islam and 
contribute to the de-radicalization of Mauritanian youth. As Islamists and VEOs recruit 
from the same demographics, eliminating Islamist parties gives greater opportunities to 
VEOs to recruit Mauritanian youth. With an increasing radicalization of Mauritanian 
youth, it is vital for Islamist groups to have the freedom and capacity to promote 
moderate versions of Islam.78 
 
Poverty and Economic Inequality 
As of 2014, only 56.8% of Mauritanian men ages 15-24 participated in the labor 
force.79 In addition, 68% of the population lives along or below the poverty line, with a 
quarter of Mauritanians living on less than USD 1.25 per day.80 Mauritania ranks 156 out 
of 188 on the Human Development Index.81 According to Anouar Boukhars, “poverty, 
relative deprivation, endemic corruption, and historical abuse influence paths to violent 
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extremism.”82 These groups provide income opportunities and the ability for 
disenfranchised citizens to be part of a mission bigger than themselves. Unemployment 
and economic inequality made several groups, specifically unemployed youth, 
sympathetic to arguments that complete Islamization of society would solve Mauritania’s 
problems.  
In Mauritania, relative deprivation and economic inequality are the most prevalent 
economic factors driving Mauritanians to join violent extremist organizations. While 
many live in extreme poverty, the White Arab caste still owns a majority of the wealth 
and power.83 They have greater access to capital and greater support from the 
government. This combination of immense poverty among all groups and extreme 
inequality between ethnic groups drives the marginalized ethnic groups to 
radicalization.84   
A lack of economic opportunity makes youth particularly susceptible to VEO 
recruitment. As has been demonstrated by the Pew Research Center, USAID, and several 
notable scholars, a country’s overall economic income or growth does not make it more 
or less susceptible to violent extremism.85 However, high levels of income inequality 
have been linked to greater levels of terrorist activity and recruitment. In a study 
conducted by Tim Kreiger at the University of Freiburg, the scholars found that a higher 
level of income inequality had a significant positive correlation with terrorist activity 
(measured by the number of terrorist attacks and terrorist victims in the country 
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regardless of nationality).86 While there has been significant disagreement over the 
impact of poverty on terrorism, there has been increasing consensus that poverty is a 
significant factor in terrorist activity when combined with other problems “like violations 
of political rights, institutional inefficacy, and corruption.”87  
A significant number of Mauritanians who become terrorists originally joined 
criminal networks to gain a source of income in the face of unemployment and 
disenfranchisement.88  VEOs are often more attractive than organized crime, as they offer 
Mauritanians, specifically Mauritanian youth, a chance to overthrow the corrupt 
governments in place and even atone for the sins in their criminal past in addition to 
benefitting economically.89 Extremists convince Mauritanians that Mauritania’s endemic 
poverty and corruption are a direct result of deviating from the right Islamic path.90 By 
joining these terrorist networks, Mauritanians can alleviate their own economic woes and, 
in their eyes, reform Mauritania’s unjust and fraudulent institutions.91  
 
Political Corruption and Organized Crime 
 The Mauritanian government is rife with corruption. In Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which “ranks countries/territories based on 
how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be,” Mauritania ranked 112 out of 
168 countries. Transparency International gave Mauritania a score of only 31 out of 100, 
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with 0 indicating the most corrupt globally and 100 indicating the least.92 Anouar 
Bukhars has similarly noted in his research that all of his interviewees identified 
pervasive corruption as one of the main drivers of dissatisfaction and tension among 
Mauritanians.93 
 The management of resources and dispersion of power is highly clientelistic, 
feeding corruption and hindering wealth creation.94 Tribal and ethnic affiliations form the 
basis for this clientelist system.95 If the president wants to punish deviant politicians or 
members of the elite, he will exclude them from this clientelist network and the resources 
it provides.96 Within natural resource management, this clientelism leads to inefficient 
use of Mauritania’s natural resources. Mauritanians see their country’s resources, 
specifically its abundance of fish and iron, and become frustrated with the dire poverty 
and underdevelopment of their nation. 97 The clientelism only benefits those of the White 
Arab class. As a result, the fight over Mauritania’s resources is steadily becoming a game 
of “us-versus-them.”98 In turn, those excluded from the share of resources and political 
power turn to VEOs as a way to access wealth or potentially to overthrow those in 
power.99  
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Corruption also exacerbates ethnic tension. Corrupt and clientelist governments 
that grant resources only to their supporters on the basis of ethnicity or identity strengthen 
the importance of ethnic or tribal affiliations.  When those in power grant resources and 
power to those within their own ethnic group, outside ethnic groups can only gain those 
resources and positions by coming into power themselves.100 In consequence, ethnic or 
tribal groups may resort to terrorist activities to achieve this goal of removing the 
political elites in power.101  This is especially common in regions rife with intrastate 
conflict. VEOs are able to capitalize on ethnic grievances to recruit new members and 
justify violence.102  
 Members of the Mauritanian government have allowed organized crime networks 
to continue if they benefit members of the government elite. Illicit flow of goods has been 
common throughout the region. By capturing these flows, state officials can privately 
benefit. However, private capture of the profit from goods transport does not benefit the 
state.103 In fact, state collusion with organized crime undermines state stability and 
supports the drug and weapons trade.104 This trade often incidentally supports terrorist 
networks both by forming new recruits and paying the terrorist groups for secure transit 
across VEO territory.105 For example, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the current leader of al-
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Maraboutines and one of the historically leading figures in AQIM, began his career 
running a cigarette smuggling network across the Sahel.106  
Corruption undermines state capacity. The Mauritanian government does not have 
the capacity to govern all of its territory or provide basic services for its population.107 It 
is largely underfunded, lacking the technology and manpower needed to regulate its large 
swaths of sparse landmass or provide basic social services to those it governs.108 Lack of 
governance over swaths of territory also strengthens terrorist activity and recruitment. 
Poor governance allows VEOs to recruit and gain legitimacy, as the state is not able to 
enforce laws effectively or retain its monopoly on the use of force.109 When a 
government does not effectively control large areas of its country or properly monitor its 
borders, criminal and terrorist networks penetrate these states.110 This has been especially 
common across sub-Saharan Africa and has allowed internationally sponsored terrorist 
networks to use politically weak regions as operational bases.111 As states lose authority 
over areas within their territory, the citizens within those areas may follow or be forced to 
follow the authority of armed groups/VEOs in the area. These criminal and terrorist 
networks then set up informal economies and tax the citizens in that area.112 This 
considerably increases the strength and power of these groups.   
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 This corruption acts as an incentive for Mauritanians, particularly Mauritanian 
youth, to join violent extremist organizations. As a small group of political elite 
accumulate resources and power, Mauritanians do not see mechanisms for change within 
their government or civil society. As a result, they are more likely to turn to VEOs and 
criminal networks to gain access to resources or disrupt Mauritania’s regime. Ironically, 
Mauritania’s elite support these same criminal networks. This web of corruption in 
Mauritania leads to a disenfranchised population, inefficiency in resource use, and the 
greater likelihood for radicalization of Mauritanian citizens. Without tackling this 
corruption, counterterrorism efforts will not tackle a major root of extremism in 
Mauritania.     
 
Ineffective Creation and Implementation of Laws  
 There is little due process or effective application of the law in any area of 
Mauritania’s judicial system. Notably, Mauritania does not effectively prosecute those 
who abuse human rights, specifically those who violate the rights of women and other 
marginalized groups. Mauritania only made slavery punishable by law in 2007 and has 
yet to effectively criminalize violence against women.113 Even when there are laws on the 
books to prosecute violations of human rights, the judicial system does not execute them 
in court. Lalla Aicha Cheikhou Ouédraogo, President of the Committee of Solidarity with 
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the Victims of Human Rights Violations, has emphasized that the primary problem is the 
lack of application of existing laws.114  
Until recently, there was no adequate law criminalizing slavery. In 2015, the 
Mauritanian government established a new anti-slavery law that sentences an offender to 
20 years in prison, effectively doubling the previous jail sentence. The law also combats 
ten other types of slavery, including child marriage and forced marriage of widows.115 
However, it remains unclear whether the government and law enforcement will 
effectively execute the law.116 Many in Mauritania follow the Maliki School of Islamic 
law, and many within that school believe that Islam justifies slavery.117 As a result, it is 
more common for judges to release the slaver, often prosecuting the enslaved person 
instead, as they do not view slavery as a crime.118 
 When people cannot find justice in the traditional mechanisms of the state, they 
will turn elsewhere. Aminetou Ely, President of the Association of Women Heads of 
Families, cites Mauritania’s weak judicial system as one of the major recruiting factors 
for violent extremist organizations: “Terrorism recruits among discriminated people, 
among poor people…among the people who do not have access to justice. They recruit 
among the slaves, because they do not have someone who listens to them. They are 
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victims of injustice.”119 When people cannot find mechanisms for change within their 
own legal systems, they may turn to more radical alternatives, such as acts of terrorism, 
to achieve their goals.120 In order for the state to effectively combat terrorism, it must also 
combat the injustices that generate terrorism.121  
 
Torture 
The United Nations, academic scholars, and prominent NGOs such as Amnesty 
International have continuously called out Mauritania’s government for the use of torture 
by Mauritanian military and police. In February of this year, United Nations Human 
Rights expert Juan E. Mendez reported back from a ten-day investigation of Mauritanian 
military security facilities. During his investigation, Mendez found that cruel, inhuman, 
degrading treatment existed in all facilities he visited. He found that “the severity of the 
pain and suffering endured did constitute torture, such as in prolonged solitary 
confinement, or stress positions or severe beatings lasting several days.”122 While it is 
unclear whether Mendez was accusing the military or police of torture, both have been 
accused of torture in the past. 
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Amnesty international has continued to condemn torture by police, military 
personnel, and prison officers.123 In 2008, Amnesty International also found the 
Mauritanian government guilty of using torture against “all categories of prisoners in 
Mauritania.”124 Amnesty International found that the authorities carried out torture in the 
police school, the first police brigade, the gendarmerie barracks, the headquarters of the 
Army Chief of Staff, and the naval base.125 The organization recorded that in 2010, for 
example, Mauritanian soldiers burned and stabbed approximately 20 Malians arrested 
under charges of drug trafficking.126 The group also found that both the military and 
police used torture to extract statements of guilt.127 This was especially common in trials 
of alleged terrorists. After the detainee had been tortured and eventually signed a 
statement of guilt, the government would use the statement to sentence them in an 
immediate summary trial.128   
Under the Leahy Laws, America’s laws prohibiting security assistance to military 
units who have committed gross abuses of human rights, the United States cannot provide 
security assistance to military units or domestic law enforcement committing torture.129 
This investigation is only the most recent to demonstrate that the Mauritanian military, 
police, and prison guards continue to commit torture on a regular basis. In State’s 2014 
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Mauritania Human Rights Report (2014), the agency acknowledged that the allegations 
were credible.130 While the State Department may be investigating these allegations and 
withdrawing training and support from the military units responsible, they have not done 
so openly.   
 It is important to combat torture by Mauritanian security forces, as abuse by 
security forces creates sympathy for terrorist organizations. Scholars, such as Boukhars, 
have also cited this torture and repression as a primary factor for radicalization of 
moderate Islamists and other activists.131 When combined with a lack of due process and 
the arrests of political opposition, torture and abuse creates sympathy for VEOs among 
the civilian population and justify the violent actions of terrorist groups.  
 
Mauritania’s Future 
 Political marginalization, ethnic inequality, and abuse of human rights are all 
interconnected, providing the ideal environment for terrorist recruitment and instability. 
Madame Lailla Aicha Ouedraogo, the president of the Committee of Solidarity with 
Victims of Human Rights Violations, noted in an interview with the author that “the 
terrorists, they recruit often from the most vulnerable social groups. And the most 
vulnerable group is the slaves. The most vulnerable groups are the ethnic minorities, 
because they are very poor. Because they are discriminated against. They are 
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marginalized. They cannot work easily.”132 Without tackling all of these problems 
holistically, each problem will undermine efforts to alleviate the others.  
 In Mauritania, President Aziz has not effectively combatted these problems. Aziz 
has reduced Mauritania’s absolute poverty, with the rate of economic growth averaging at 
over 5% each year since 2012.133 In addition, he has improved the nation’s infrastructural 
development. However, his policies have contributed to the issues of ethnic inequality 
and human rights abuse. In addition, his main priority in both rhetoric and practice has 
been military strength and conventional counterterrorism. While this has alleviated many 
immediate terrorist threats, this will not tackle extremism and terrorism in Mauritania in 
the long term. The Mauritanian government will combat terrorism in the long term only 
by tackling its underlying social, political, and economic problems.  
Mauritania has an increasing problem of radicalization among its youth (ages 16 
to 24), driven largely by political dissatisfaction and extremist influences from local 
leaders.134 From 2005-2011, there was a rise in terrorist activity in Mauritania. While 
President Aziz’s militarist counterterrorism policies were effective in countering terrorist 
activity in the short term, these policies only temporarily address the issues of 
radicalization and terrorism in Mauritania. 135 The state repression, discrimination, and 
poor governance that contributed to the initial radicalization of Mauritanians still exist.136 
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Many point to Mali as an example for Mauritania’s future if the underlying factors of 
extremism remain unaddressed.137 
 In the years preceding the Tuareg rebellion and military coup in Mali, the nation 
was a leader and example for stability and democracy in the Sahel. It was as stable as 
Mauritania militarily and arguably more stable politically. Contrary to the regional trend 
of political leaders attempting to hold on to power, Malian President Amadou Toumani 
Touré was committed to respecting the constitution and stepping down from power.138 
U.S. administrations and non-governmental actors did not consider Mali at risk for a 
political coup.139 Nevertheless, the root causes of extremism and discontent – poverty, 
inequality, ethnic tensions, and radicalization – undermined this stability and plunged 
Mali into chaos.140 The influx of weapons from Libya after the fall of Gaddafi only acted 
as a catalyst for these grievances to become active political rebellion.141 
 Mali’s devolution into political chaos has caused severe political crisis across the 
Sahel. It has created openings for AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad 
in West Africa (MUJWA), and al-Maraboutines, granting them a greater foothold in the 
region. This crisis could have easily occurred in Mauritania. In fact, the conflict in Mali 
could represent Mauritania’s future if the underlying causes of extremism and discontent 
remain. In order for Mauritania to avoid this same political chaos and radicalization of its 
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population, it must address the underlying factors of impoverishment, abuse, 
marginalization, and corruption within Mauritanian society, economics, and politics 
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Chapter 2: Context for American Security Assistance 
	   	  
American Interest in Mauritania 
The United States remains engaged in the Sahel to counter the proliferation and 
growth of regional violent extremist organizations. VEOs have a foothold in the Sahara-
Sahel region, as most Sahelian states are either submerged in political chaos (Mali) or 
remain incredibly fragile (Mauritania, Niger, and Chad). Experts on international strategy 
such as Joshua Burgess have emphasized that “the situation hints at a deepening 
geopolitical entropy that will only embolden violent factions.”142 The region acts as a 
bridge between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. The United States fears that 
instability in the Sahel could spread to fragile neighboring regions, thereby posing a 
greater threat to American interests.143 The United States sees Mauritania as a key 
regional ally in counterterrorism and regional stability given Mauritania’s geographic 
position between North and Sub Saharan Africa. Once extremist organizations enter into 
North Africa, particularly Morocco, the fear is that they then have access to major 
European allies, specifically France and Spain. Frederic Wehrey of the Carnegie 
Endowment emphasized that Mauritania’s geographic position and landscape ensure that 
what happens in Mauritania does not stay in Mauritania.144  
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Poor governance, weak human rights, and a non-existent civil society have 
supported the proliferation and growth of violent extremist organizations. With the 
instability and conflict in Mali, it has become increasingly important to secure 
Mauritania’s borders. Since Mali devolved into crisis, terrorist activity has increased in 
the Maghreb as a whole.145 Among the insurgents, the United States government 
highlighted the leadership of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, and the 
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa.146 Since then, VEOs have used the crisis 
in Mali to maintain a foothold in the region, using the country’s internal strife to recruit 
militants and strengthen their organization.  
Additionally, the continued instability in North Africa, specifically Libya, has 
added to Mauritania’s strategic importance. If the United States does not counter terrorist 
groups in the Sahel, they could reestablish themselves in North Africa. This instability 
could then further spread beyond the Sahel through unsecured weapons transportation 
and the proliferation of extremist groups.147 As a result, bolstering Mauritania’s capacity 
to counter these groups and secure its borders has become a top American priority.  
These VEOs pose an immediate threat to embassies and American personnel abroad. 
For example, the Department of State has alleged that the militants who attacked the 
American Embassy in Libya had connections to AQIM.148 Hillary Clinton directly stated 
that the infamous attack “didn’t happen in a vacuum” and was instead rooted in the Arab 
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world’s recent revolutions and the instability in Mali that had created a “safe haven for 
terrorists.”149 President Obama similarly remarked that the main threat against the United 
States no longer comes from a central Al Qaeda leadership but instead from affiliated 
groups. While these groups are less likely to commit “9/11 style attacks against the 
homeland,” they still pose significant threat to American personnel oversees and to U.S. 
interests abroad.150 
 
The	  Current	  Threat	  	  
While there are several other violent extremist organizations active in Mauritania 
and the Sahel, AQIM is the most prominent. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a 
Salafi–jihadist militant group that grew out of the Algerian Civil War. The group was 
first called the Armed Islamic Group (AIG) and later evolved to become the Salafist 
Group for Preaching and Combat. In the early 2000s, the group aligned itself with Al-
Qaeda in order to improve its recruiting and fundraising ability. It also aligned itself with 
Al-Qaeda in order to stage higher profile attacks.151 The group has claimed it wants to 
create an Islamic emirate encompassing the Sahel and the Maghreb.152 Largely because 
of its affiliation with Al Qaeda and its international rhetoric, AQIM has received the 
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greatest amount of political attention among the Sahelien VEOs from Western media and 
scholars. 
During the early 2000s, AQIM posed only a moderate threat to American interests 
as compared to other Al Qaeda affiliates and little threat to targets abroad. A RAND 2014 
study classified the group as a “medium threat.” A medium threat classification indicates 
that while AQIM poses a threat to American facilities, embassies, and citizens oversees, 
it does not pose a threat to the U.S. homeland.153  While the group has almost always had 
the capacity to attack the United States and its European enemies, it has not.154 The study 
also demonstrated that AQIM conducted fewer attacks in the 2000s than any other Al 
Qaeda affiliate studied. According to the RAND Corporation, while other groups had 
increased their attacks, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb appeared to be less active.155156 
Primarily, they focused on kidnapping foreigners.157  
During the early 2000s, AQIM also began to fracture. In 2012, Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar, a famous Algerian jihadist and an AQIM leader, split off from AQIM to 
establish the al-Mulathamun Battalion.158 A senior counterterrorism official at the State 
Department at the time called Belmokhtar “a more adventurous, perhaps even more 
reckless operator than the A.Q.I.M. leadership has shown itself to be….and that translates 
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into a threat.” 159 Less than a year after its creation, al-Mulathamun Battalion carried out a 
deadly attack on a gas plant in Algeria, killing 38 people (including three Americans).160 
Since then, the group formed an alliance with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West 
Africa, consolidating their resources and allowing them to carry out more attacks. The 
group, al-Mourabitines, has recently received media attention yet it poses one of the 
greatest threats to the region in recent years. 
 Most recently, the group has reestablished its relationship with Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb. Together, these groups have carried out the two most recent attacks on 
luxury hotels in Mali and Burkina Faso.161 These groups working together pose a 
significantly greater threat to the security of foreigners and locals, the interests of the 
United States in the Sahel, and the security of Sahelian governments.162 The 
consolidation of regional VEOs poses a greater threat to Western and American interests, 
as these groups have become more focused on targeting Westerners and Western 
interests.163 When each organization acted independently with its own mission, there was 
a significant threat to stability and human security in the region but a lower risk that these 
groups would carry out larger terrorist attacks. Now that several of these organizations 
are working together, this risk has increased.  Media outlets, such as CNN and the New 
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York Times, have called the attacks proof that there is an “al Qaeda revival in Africa.”164 
There has also been increasing discussion in scholarship and the media over an Al-
Qaeda/al-Mourabitines – ISIS rivalry over recruits and international attention.165  
In 2016 alone, AQIM, al-Maraboutines, and MUJWA have staged attacks in 
Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Mali, and Niger. If West African and foreign governments 
do not effectively address the underlying factors that strengthen these groups, these 
VEOs will only get stronger. Instability in the region will worsen and attacks against 
national governments and Western targets will increase.  
 
American Policy Towards Mauritania  
The United States did not view Mauritania as a significant security partner until 
the attacks of September 11th and the subsequent expansion of the American war on 
terror. The United States was no longer able to maintain its primacy and security 
dominance through conventional deterrence. Instead, the United States determined it 
needed to fight transnational threats.166 Africa quickly became the Bush administration’s 
secondary theater in the war on terror, rooting out safe havens for terrorists.167 
Before 9/11 occurred and the United States established the Pan-Sahel Initiative, 
the United States placed little emphasis on Mauritania as a strategic partner. While the 
United States supported Mauritanian security efforts, the United States also suspended 
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that support in the face of severe human rights abuse. In 1991, the United States 
suspended its International Military and Education Training (IMET) funding to 
Mauritania as a result of the systematic imprisonment and subsequent deaths of hundreds 
of Mauritania’s black political prisoners.168 This was in the wake of the Mauritanian 
government’s deportation of tens of thousands of its Afro-Mauritanian citizens to 
Senegal.169 At the time, the United States and Mauritania were on opposing sides of the 
Gulf War, and the United States had little reason to provide security assistance to the 
Mauritanian regime.170 According to the State Department, Mauritania later “turned away 
from Iraq and towards the West” in the late 1990s, thereby improving its relationship 
with the United States.171  
With 9/11 and the start of the war on terror, the United States placed a greater 
emphasis on Mauritania and other periphery nations in security partnerships. As the 
American government increased the salience of these partnerships, it became less likely 
that the United States would suspend aid in the face of human rights abuses. In fact, the 
Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) – the predecessor to the TSCTP – did not include economic 
development, governance, human rights, or other social reforms in its mandate.172 The 
start of the PSI also marked a shift towards offensive military training of national forces 
in the Sahel.173  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Human Rights Watch, Mauritania’s Campaign of Terror: State-Sponsored Repression of Black Africans 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), 147.  
169 “Mauritania,” U.S. Department of State, accessed March 10, 2016, 
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/mauritania/85037.htm.   
170 Ibid.  
171 Ibid.  
172 Lianne Kennedy Boudali, “The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,” The Combating Terrorism 
Center, April 2007, 4, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a466542.pdf.  
173 Ibid. 
 
 
47 
 
During the Pan-Sahel Initiative (2001-2004), President Maaouya Sid Ahmed Taya 
ruled Mauritania. His regime enacted brutal policies. As Mauritania became increasingly 
important to the American government in the war on terror, Taya used counterterrorism 
as an excuse to hunt down political dissidents including Islamists, anti-slavery activists, 
and democratic opposition parties.174  Some organizations have alleged a link between 
American security assistance and state oppression in Mauritania. The International 
Federation for Human Rights specifically alleged that the Taya regime increased state 
oppression in order to receive American military and economic support: 
The most widespread and credible analyses showed the necessity for the former 
president, Ould Taya, to exaggerate the Islamist threat to demonstrate action in 
the global fight against terrorism and thus attract the good graces of the United 
States for economic and military support. This posturing also served as a pretext 
to stifle all forms of protests and oppositions of power. In search of international 
legitimacy after its coup d’Etat on 5 August 2005, the CMJD seems to have 
followed this strategy to strengthen power that was illegally obtained.175 
 
This does not imply that the United States knew the extent of the Taya regime’s brutality 
when it provided the nation with military aid. However, this demonstrates that the United 
States has already inadvertently supported an abusive regime in Mauritania because it did 
not effectively monitor and evaluate the impact of its policies. While Taya lost power in a 
2005 military coup, the current regime maintains oppressive policies, including the use of 
torture.176    
Since then, the United States has supported the Mauritanian regime and military 
despite their appalling human rights records, with the exception of aid suspension 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Anouar Boukhars, “Mauritania’s Precarious Stability and Islamist Undercurrent,” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, February 2016, 6-7. 
175“Mauritania: The Case of the ‘Islamists’: Torture in the Name of the Fight Against Terrorism,” 
International Federation for Human Rights, 30. 
176 Hannah Armstrong, “Torture Against Terrorism,” The New York Times, May 7, 2013, 
http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/fighting-terrorism-in-mauritania-even-it-means-torture/?_r=0.  
 
 
48 
 
immediately following military coups. Immediately following the 2008 coup against 
Mauritania’s democratically elected government, the United States froze all non-
humanitarian aid.177 After General Aziz held (and won) elections in 2009, the United 
States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, World Bank, and others resumed ties and aid 
to the country.178 Since then, the United States has maintained security assistance to 
Mauritania, specifically through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. 
Currently, Mauritania receives significant funding given its proximity to the crisis 
in Mali and the presence of AQIM in its northern territory.179 Within the TSCTP, 
Mauritania has received the second greatest amount of funding. Between 2009 and 2013, 
Mali received the greatest amount of TSCTP funds at $40.6 million.180 Mauritania 
followed closely behind, receiving $34.5 million.181 Due to the crisis in Mali, the United 
States places a heavier security emphasis on Mauritania in comparison to other countries 
within the TSCTP. As a result, the Mauritanian government has been able to avoid 
human rights programs implemented in other TSCTP nations.  
While the American government created the TSCTP to embody a whole of 
government approach to counterterrorism, the TSCTP is not a “whole of government” 
program in practice. The TSCTP in Mauritania suffers from a lack of effective 
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coordination between State and DOD. Specifically, American policy in Mauritania 
overemphasizes the security threat and its security response without giving due attention 
to the human rights issues that foster extremism. While the Department of Defense 
implements strict, regional training programs, USAID and the State Department have not 
implemented mandatory programming or maintained the same consistency in 
programming. While USAID and State have lower funding and fewer resources than the 
Department of Defense, they are in charge of all monitoring and evaluation for human 
rights and development programs (with the exception of those directly created by DOD). 
As a result, State and USAID do not have the capacity to effectively monitor and develop 
all of their programs. 
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Chapter 3: Failures in “Whole of Government” Counterterrorism 
 
American Interests 
The American government fights terrorism abroad first and foremost to protect its 
citizens at home and around the world.182 American domestic attitudes have helped 
sustain the American government’s efforts in the war on terror. Pew Research has 
demonstrated in recent studies that Americans remain highly concerned over the potential 
for a terrorist attack on American soil. These concerns are reinforced by terrorist attacks 
against Western targets abroad. Pew Research recorded that nearly as many Americans 
feared an attack against the U.S. would come “soon” immediately following the Paris 
shootings as did immediately following 9/11.183 More Americans than ever before (62%) 
also say they are “very concerned” about the rise of Islamic extremism globally.184 
Finally, a Gallup poll recorded that 79% of Americans currently see international 
terrorism as a critical threat to “the vital interests of the United States in the next ten 
years.”185 
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The United States also provides security assistance largely to maintain its global 
sphere of influence. Security partnerships give the United States the relationships, 
resources, and historical precedents it can leverage to secure policies beneficial to its own 
interests.186  Even in areas remote from the United States and with little relevance to 
current American objectives, the United States preserves some presence, specifically in 
regards to security, in case a crisis occurs.187 The United States 2015 Military Strategy, 
for example, stated that the United States remains committed to “projecting global 
influence” and that the United States does not have the luxury of focusing on only one 
region or issue – all are interconnected and vital to American interests.188 This is 
specifically relevant for regions that are highly susceptible to coercion by more powerful 
states and regions that have the potential to become conflict zones. This has been shown 
in American involvement in Africa and Asia, where the United States continues to 
demonstrate its military and economic presence in order to balance Chinese interests and 
to ensure regional stability.189  
 
American Goals 
The primary goal of American foreign security assistance programs intended to 
combat global terrorism is to ensure that recipients are self-sufficient and successful in 
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countering and preventing terrorism.190 This is impossible when a government is seen as 
illegitimate or ineffective. A government’s loss of legitimacy and a population’s extreme 
dissatisfaction with its government provide an ideal environment for terrorist activity. If a 
state is unable to maintain order and provide basic services, the nation’s standard of 
living remains low or deteriorates, and the population has no governmental mechanisms 
to redress these issues.191 This disaffected population is highly susceptible to violent 
extremist organization (VEO) recruitment, as they have to seek other ways of receiving 
basic social protections and services.192 This is especially pertinent in countries without 
an active civil society. When a government has marginalized civil society organizations 
while failing to provide needed social services, it drives its population to join extremist 
organizations and criminal networks that can provide such services. 193  
Weak social services, underdeveloped judicial systems, and security services’ 
abuses of human rights intertwine with security threats, creating greater opportunities for 
terrorism and weakening the state. As a result, the U.S. must effectively respond to these 
issues to fully combat terrorism. Human rights programs in U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
have taken the form of “multifaceted” strategies that assist governments in strengthening 
“immediate and longer term capabilities.”194 These programs encompass multiple 
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agencies, notably the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and USAID.195 In 
theory, these interagency programs are the answer to addressing both human rights and 
security in counterterrorism. In practice, these programs suffer from limited resources 
and a lack of coordinated strategy among agencies. Increasingly, American security 
assistance has come under criticism for being largely ineffective. The Brookings 
Institution stated that American security assistance has been applied too broadly, 
rewarded bad behavior, and failed to enforce accountability mechanisms. As a result, 
American security assistance has not been effectively used as leverage for greater 
political reforms or as a tool to effectively promote security in developing nations.196 
Similarly, the Center for New American Security has argued that security partnerships 
and assistance programs have become an end in themselves, with little examination of the 
true efficacy of security assistance in achieving America’s strategic goals.197 
For the FY 2015, the Department of Defense received $495.6 billion in 
discretionary funding.198 In comparison, USAID and the State Department had to share 
$40.3 billion. This gross inequality between DOD and the State department manifests in 
whole of government counterterrorism programs. This overemphasis on the Department 
of Defense and security undermines American security assistance to Mauritania. The 
Department of Defense has continuously swallowed human rights abuse, corruption, 
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inequality, and ethnic conflict into its mission; however, its primary agenda does not 
focus on these topics. As a result, DOD personnel are unequipped to effectively combat 
these issues. In Mauritania, it has barely implemented programs to counter social, 
political, and economic problems. When the DOD does implement diplomacy and 
development programs, it does so through the lens of immediate security interest. 
Unfortunately, DOD takes on significantly more of these programs under its purview in 
counterterrorism efforts.199 This takes away authority from State and USAID. In 
implementing social, economic, and political programs, DOD prioritizes short term 
results and short term response to security threats over long term stability and 
development.200 This undermines security in the long term.     
  
Civilian	  Engagement	  and	  Humanitarian	  Assistance	  	  
When these factors of state weakness, inequality, and ethnic tension come 
together in one setting, they create a perfect environment for terrorist activities. In these 
cases, conflicting groups and violent extremist organizations are more likely to use 
terrorism as a tactic and are better able to convince others to do the same.201 USAID 
attempts to mitigate these problems by engaging civilians in dialogue with each other and 
the government, as well as providing economic assistance to those in need.202 The State 
Department’s Bureau of African Affairs works directly with USAID on programs to 
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reduce the appeal of joining VEOs. In Somalia and Kenya, the agencies use radio, 
theatre, music, social media, and local groups to spread messages countering the appeal 
of extremist organizations.203 The Bureau of African Affairs also has an Economic 
Support Fund to promote democratic participation, political reconciliation, and 
governance activities broadly.204  Similarly, in USAID’s Peace Through Development II 
program, the agency assists youth in communities in Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso. The 
program focuses on providing vocational and entrepreneurial skills, civic education, and 
forums for dialogue.205  
Unfortunately, USAID and State do not receive enough support to maintain the 
monitoring, evaluation, and funding structures to sustain many of these programs. State 
and USAID programs receive less funding than is needed to achieve maximum utility and 
impact. For example, USAID in Mali did not receive funding in 2006. While the program 
received funding in 2005 and 2007, the lack of funds in 2006 caused the suspension of a 
peace-building program in Northern Mali. This caused the Malian government to 
question USAID’s commitment to TSCTP activities in the country.206   
Instead, the Department of Defense takes on the majority of development and 
social programming in Mauritania. The United States provides support for food and 
agriculture both through the Department of Defense and USAID. In comparison to 
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USAID programming in other TSCTP countries, USAID in Mauritania does not focus at 
all on peacebuilding programs. The USAID efforts in Mauritania primarily involve food 
aid and poverty reduction. It appears that this is a direct result of the influx of Malian 
refugees into Mauritania after the start of the crisis in Mali. While USAID contributed as 
much as $20.6 million in 2012, it only contributed $3 million in food aid in FY 2016. All 
of this aid went directly to “Emergency” funding, with no money designated to 
development.207 The Department of Defense undertakes development and humanitarian 
assistance efforts through the AFRICOM Humanitarian Assistance Program. In 
Mauritania, this program undertook many of the activities conventionally under USAID. 
In 2013, for example, AFRICOM funded and implemented seven livestock inspection 
and vaccination facilities in Mauritania.208 
While the United States makes conventional security programs mandatory in 
TSCTP countries, there is extreme leniency in the application of USAID and State 
programs. The American government also does not place sufficient priority on 
implementing these programs or providing humanitarian assistance. While Mauritania’s 
cooperation within the TSCTP should include the economic development, governance, 
and human rights areas of the TSCTP, there are few of these programs currently in place 
in Mauritania. In regards to peace building and community empowerment, DOD also 
takes on more of this programming in Mauritania. Mauritania was able to opt-out of 
USAID’s Peace Through Development program, creating its own vocational training 
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program and accepting limited DOD social and political programming. Mauritania’s opt-
out of USAID’s Peace Through Development program demonstrates the inequality 
between conventional security and human rights programs. 
PDEV works on good governance, youth empowerment and integration, media 
outreach, and support to vulnerable communities.209 Before it ended, the program in 
Mauritania had targeted populations at-risk of recruitment from extremist organizations, 
helping to identify the drivers of extremism in Mauritania and direct TSCTP action 
accordingly.210 In a 2011 USAID assessment report on the PDEV program, USAID noted 
that the program had been shut down in Mauritania due to “political changes.”211 While 
the report indicated that USAID intended to restart the program, the agency could not.212  
According to USAID, the agency invited Mauritania to join the program in its 
second phase (PDEV II) from 2011 to 2016; however, Mauritania opted out, noting that it 
preferred bilateral assistance over multilateral programming.213 Specifically, the 
Mauritanian government would not accept PDEV II’s delegation to NGOs to administer 
the program.214 To replace the Peace Through Development program, Mauritania 
installed a vocational training program through the Mauritanian Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Development (MAED). USAID and the Mauritanian government implement 
the program through a Limited Scope Grant Agreement (LSGA). Instead of USAID 
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directly managing the program, the Mauritanian government covers the costs of the 
program and then submits reimbursements to USAID.215 In theory, giving the host 
government full control of a development program is a step in the right direction; 
however, the Mauritanian government is corrupt and actively excludes specific 
Mauritanian ethnic and social groups.216 As a result, the program under Mauritanian 
authority is likely not as effective as it would be under direct USAID oversight.  
The Peace Through Development program would likely have a great impact on 
counterterrorism efforts in Mauritania. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
noted that the program had made at least “moderate progress” in accessing marginalized 
populations. The GAO in fact recommended that the program be expanded, hinting that a 
suspension of the program could undermine U.S. objectives.217 Mauritania’s current 
vocational program does not appear as expansive as the PDEV II program. There is no 
emphasis on youth empowerment, integration, or outreach to vulnerable populations. As 
a result, Mauritania’s program does not tackle the root causes of terrorism to the same 
extent as PDEV II.  
In place of PDEV, DOD implements its own programming. For example, the 
Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE), Military Information Support Teams (MIST), 
and the Public Affairs Section (PAS) focus on promoting tolerance, pro-American 
sentiment, and moderate Islamic perspectives in Mauritania.218 MIST and PAS recently 
considered implementing a national radio program in Mauritania to “promote tolerance 
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and national unity.” The teams modeled this program after a similar, successful program 
implemented in Niger.219 PAS also implemented a sports diplomacy program to keep 
Mauritanian youth away from terrorist recruitment.220 Broadly, these teams also put on 
events for local speakers espousing moderate viewpoints and capacity-building seminars 
for local militaries.221 These programs, while beneficial, focus primarily on improving 
America’s image and promoting tolerance broadly without targeting the underlying 
problem of ethnic tension and disenfranchisement.  
 The United States has little programming on human rights and development in 
Mauritania and has largely excluded USAID and State from any programming. As a 
result, American counterterrorism efforts do not address the underlying judicial, 
governmental, and social problems driving extremism. This is not representative of the 
spirit or goals of the TSCTP and undermines American counterterrorism policy.  
 
Human Rights Vetting 
  The State Department is also responsible for human rights vetting and human 
rights training goals for the Department of Defense in their programs with local forces. 
While a majority of the funding for the TSCTP does not fall under Leahy Law 
restrictions, the State Department and Department of Defense are generally expected to 
conduct human rights vetting in all of their military training. The State Department and 
embassies conduct the majority of the human rights vetting for military units that it then 
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communicates to the Department of Defense.222 While DOD can conduct its own vetting, 
typically DOD personnel are uninvolved in the process after they submit names to the 
State Department for vetting.223 As a result, the majority of the work for vetting these 
military units falls entirely on the Department of State even though the Department of 
State has significantly less funding and capacity than the Department of Defense. As a 
result, the State Department has not effectively implemented Leahy Law vetting 
processes within all of its embassies, providing significantly outdated information to 
much of its staff. 
The Leahy Laws are an example of the tension between security and human 
rights. According to the Government Accountability Office, the Leahy Laws were 
“intended to encourage accountability and professionalism in foreign security forces by 
leveraging U.S. assistance to encourage foreign governments to prevent human rights 
violations and hold violators accountable.”224 Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
the term ‘‘gross violations of internationally recognized human rights’’ includes torture 
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without 
charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine 
detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the 
security of person.225 In theory, the Leahy Laws are an example of the American 
Congress leveraging security assistance to deter foreign militaries from committing gross 
abuses of human rights. However, the American government has demonstrated that in 
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countries facing immediate security - specifically terrorist - threats within or at their 
borders, the U.S. government provides those countries with security assistance without 
the Leahy Law conditions.  
Under the Leahy Laws, security assistance includes any training, equipment, or 
any other support to military forces.226 The Leahy Laws attempt to restrict American 
support to abusive militaries by making it illegal for the State Department or Department 
of Defense to provide training, funding, or equipment to military units who have 
committed gross abuses of human rights.227  The definition of “unit” has since been 
specified to mean “the smallest operational group in the field that has been implicated in 
the reported violation.”228 The State and DOD Leahy Laws apply to Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Joint Combined Exchange Training 
(JCET), and assistance funded by the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund.229 
However, the laws do not apply to International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
(INCLE) funds and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs 
(NADR) funds.230 While Congress has not stated their reasoning explicitly, these two 
programs are likely exempt from Leahy Law vetting because they respond directly to 
security threats. The State Department highlights that INCLE funds are used “where 
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security situations are most dire.”231 Similarly, NADR funds go directly to non-
proliferation and anti-terrorism projects –vital American security priorities.232 
While referred to generally as “the Leahy Law(s),” there is one Leahy Law for the 
Department for Defense and another for the Department of State.233  The first set of 
Leahy Laws, established in the 1990s, amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.234 A 
similar amendment was added to the Defense Appropriations Act.235 The laws established 
conditions for providing foreign security assistance, including assistance to antiterrorism 
operations.236 Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the United States also cannot 
provide assistance to “the police, domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces 
of a country” if there is credible information that they are committing gross abuses of 
human rights.237  
Under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, “No assistance shall 
be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security 
forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such 
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”238 A similar clause exists under 
Section 8057 of the Defense Appropriations Act: “None of the funds made available by 
this Act may be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for a unit of a 
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foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit 
has committed a gross violation of human rights.”239 Under both the Defense 
Appropriations Act and the Foreign Assistance Act, the State Department has the 
responsibility to communicate information on human rights abuse to the Department of 
Defense and DOD must take such allegations seriously.240 The State Department has the 
responsibility to maintain a list of all units receiving security assistance and periodically 
request information from embassies, DOD, and the CIA on allegations of human rights 
abuse.241 This information can come from NGO, media, or civilian sources but should be 
corroborated by multiple parties.242 
If a foreign military unit fails the vetting process, the American government can 
still provide security assistance if the Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate), the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (House of Representatives), and the Committee on 
Appropriations determine that the government of that country is taking “steps to address 
the violations” and bring the individual perpetrators to justice.243 In order to assist a unit 
under investigation, DOD is required to ensure that “all necessary corrective steps have 
been taken” to prevent the abuse from happening again.244 This leaves the requirements 
of the Leahy Laws largely open to interpretation.245 Similarly, the Department of State 
can support these units if the host government demonstrates the police or soldiers who 
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committed the abuses are brought to justice.246 The State Department can assist the host 
government in this process. 247  
Since Congress first passed the Leahy Laws, they have been amended to exclude 
specific countries and programs. Congress can exempt specific programs and nations 
from the Leahy Laws if Congress believes they are vital to achieving an American 
interest. In the Senate appropriations bill for the Department of State, foreign operations, 
and related programs for FY 2014, clauses prohibiting assistance to abusive militaries 
were written to exclude specific countries or counterterrorism programs. The restrictions 
on foreign assistance did not apply to IMET “assistance to Ethiopian military efforts in 
support of international peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism along the border with 
Somalia, and for assistance to the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College.”248 In 
addition, the Department of Defense can now provide assistance to militaries regardless 
of their human rights record if the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State 
determine an extraordinary circumstance overrides the importance of the Leahy Law 
provisions.249 In some areas, however, aid is still conditioned on human rights. For 
example, under the FY 2016 Appropriations Bill for the Department of State, foreign 
operations, and related programs, American foreign military financing to Egypt has been 
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conditioned on the release of political prisoners, respect for civil freedoms, and the 
advancement of democracy and human rights.250  
When the Leahy Laws are applied, their application is often weak and 
inconsistent. The Government Accountability Office found that while the State 
Department is supposed to ensure that each embassy has a standard operating procedure 
(SOP) up-to-date and in place for human rights vetting, very few SOPs are adequately 
updated. It was unclear whether some embassies had standard operating procedures in 
place for Leahy Law requirements.251 This problem is exacerbated by inadequate follow-
up by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.252 While 
the department told GAO that they reviewed embassy standard operating procedures, 
GAO found that many embassies did not have SOPs in place and that the SOPs in place 
were inconsistent between embassies.253 Even once an embassy has put a standard 
operating procedure in place for complying with the Leahy Laws, the embassy is likely to 
receive insufficient and outdated information. In GAO’s same report, the office found 
that both personnel in Washington, D.C. and within the embassies received outdated 
training on human rights vetting. Leahy Law training occurs primarily on independent, 
online courses and within other professional trainings. As a result, it is difficult to ensure 
that all vetting staff sufficiently understand the vetting process and can implement it 
effectively.254 
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From the Government Accountability Office’s report, it seems that the Leahy Law 
procedure has not been effectively implemented in many embassies. While the Leahy 
Laws are mandated under certain programs, it is also unclear when they are applied 
beyond that mandate. For example, the DOD Regional Counterterrorism Fellowship 
Program (CTFP) apparently vets all participants as a matter of policy.255  In comparison, 
it is unclear if and when programs such as NADR implement Leahy Law vetting 
procedures. Whenever it is implemented, the Leahy vetting process is inconsistent and 
has few mechanisms to ensure vetting staff can effectively execute the procedure. These 
problems impact both the State and DOD Leahy Laws. While the Department of Defense 
conducts its own vetting of new security forces, the State Department is also meant to 
communicate its results of vetting potential recipients of American security assistance to 
the Department of Defense.256 The Department of Defense then cannot use any funds 
granted through the Department of State security assistance program to train units 
accused of human rights abuses.257 If the State Department does not carry out adequate 
vetting, vetting will not be sufficient across the board.   
The American government needs to reevaluate human rights within the TSCTP as 
a whole. While the TSCTP currently emphasizes human rights and development within 
security efforts, the TSCTP lacks human rights accountability mechanisms at its 
foundation. Funding for the security aspects of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership comes primarily from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Nina Serafino et al., “’Leahy Law’ Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview,” 
9.  
256 “Report to Congress,” Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, 2015, 3. 
http://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/FY15_Regional_Defense_Combating_Terrorism
_Fellowship_Program_Report_to_Congress.pdf.  
257 “Human Rights: Additional Guidance, Monitoring, and Training Could Improve Implementation of the 
Leahy Laws,” Government Accountability Office, 4. 
 
 
67 
 
Related Programs and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement finances. In fact, 
NADR funds all of the counterterrorism efforts under the TSCTP; the Bureau of 
Counterterrorism them coordinates these initiatives.258 As a result, many units receiving 
counterterrorism support under the TSCTP do not need to be vetted under the Leahy Law 
provisions.259 While the DOD still assures that the programs do conduct human rights 
vetting, there are no legal mechanisms to ensure it follows through on this vetting.  
 
Human Rights Training  
The Department of Defense is responsible for implementing human rights training 
within its training programs for foreign security forces. However, DOD does not 
sufficiently stress the importance of human rights within military training. As a result, 
DOD does not fully implement human rights training in partner countries with abusive 
militaries. DOD and State cooperation on human rights is best shown through IMET. The 
Department of State and the Department of Defense share responsibility for International 
Military Education and Training. State determines the level of funding for each country 
as well as IMET’s strategic objectives within each nation. The Department of Defense is 
responsible for executing the program, developing program administration and 
implementation in the field.260 The American government established IMET to train 
foreign militaries in American tactics and the use of American equipment. In addition, 
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the program is intended to improve human rights awareness among foreign militaries.261 
Since it first established IMET, the American government has given the program the 
responsibility of training foreign militaries in civil-military relations and respect for 
civilian control.262  
However, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has 
not effectively implemented its human rights education programming. In Mauritania in 
2012, the Government Accountability Office noted that IMET only touched upon human 
rights broadly in its military training but did not mention civil-military relations, rule of 
law, military justice, or other pertinent human rights issues.263 If IMET has not 
effectively implemented these initiatives, it is highly unlikely that other DOD programs 
are discussing human rights sufficiently.  
Many of the programs that finance equipment and training under DOD programs 
are under the Department of State. DOD then executes these programs. The Department 
of Defense provides training to foreign military forces through the International Military 
and Education Training program, the Joint Combined Exchange Training program, the 
Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program, and other training initiatives within the 
different military branches. IMET and CTFP are the two most prevalent programs in 
whole of government counterterrorism initiatives in developing nations. Apart from 
specific training initiatives, the direct funding and equipping of regional counterterrorism 
programs come from Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and the 
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Peacekeeping Operations account. While State delegates the program funding for each 
account to each country, DOD uses the funds to carry out its activities.264  
The Peacekeeping Operations Account supports multilateral and regional 
peacekeeping and stability operations, specifically through funding and equipping foreign 
militaries in their counterterrorism operations.265 Foreign Military Financing provides 
direct grants and loans to foreign nations to purchase American weapons, defense 
articles, defense services, and military training.266 Broadly, FMF allows the President to 
finance the provision of defense articles and services for foreign nations. Within global 
and regional counterterrorism initiatives, such as the TSCTP, FMF has been used to 
sustain capacity building programs.267 Finally, Foreign Military Sales allows the 
American government and the foreign government to enter into a direct sales agreement 
for arms and technology.268 FMS is not used to directly finance programs and so is used 
less in counterterrorism programs in developing nations.  
The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program trains foreign militaries for 
regional cooperation on detecting, monitoring, and interdicting terrorist activities.269 The 
program specifically trains military officers, ministry of defense officials, and foreign 
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security officials.270 The CTFP tailors its programs towards specific institutional, 
training, and capacity programs within foreign militaries. This program is unique in its 
focus on combatting the ideology behind terrorism. The CTFP supports national “human 
and intellectual capital that understands the ideologies and mechanisms of terrorism” so 
that experts can effectively combat the proliferation of terrorist ideology within their own 
countries.271 While the program is tailored to the needs of individual nations, the CTFP 
attempts to streamline understanding and strategy in counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism operations.272 The CTFP is required to vet all its participants for human 
rights abuses.273 
Professionalizing and training foreign militaries is especially important to 
counterterrorism efforts, particularly in mitigating abuses by security forces. Abuses by 
national militaries have also been linked to an increase in terrorist activities. Bruce 
Hoffman, a scholar on terrorism, sees abuse by security forces - both foreign and 
domestic – as the most common reason individuals join terrorist groups. This can be 
either the result of abusive domestic policies or the local population seeing foreign 
security forces as an occupying force.274 Scholars from the International Crisis Group 
have produced similar findings: “Reliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to 
counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good when they undermine 
constitutionalism, democratic governance and the rule of law and provide grist to the 
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jihadis’ propaganda mill.”275 Abusive military tactics such as the use of torture negatively 
impact civilian perceptions of foreign and domestic military forces. It makes civilians 
less likely to come forward with information on suspected terrorists and makes it easier 
for terrorist groups to justify their behavior against these forces.276 Civilians may then 
become more sympathetic to terrorist activities against these forces, making them more 
susceptible to recruitment by terrorist organizations.277  
Unfortunately, DOD’s training programs often neglect to appropriately 
incorporate human rights. While State emphasizes that human rights are a part of the 
mission and objectives for these programs, they are rarely enforced. While IMET’s 
original mission included focusing on human rights awareness training for foreign forces, 
this has only been implemented in about a quarter of countries with poor human rights 
records receiving IMET assistance, and none had received training that encompassed all 
of the human rights priorities laid out by the State Department.278279 By failing to follow 
through on human rights training and commitments within its programs, DOD 
undermines interagency human rights goals and security assistance as a whole. 
Recently, the political crisis in Mali demonstrated this failure to train foreign 
militaries effectively in human rights and respect for civil-military relations. The leader 
of the coup against the Malian president, Captain Amadou Haya Sanago, received 
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training from the American military from 2004 to 2010.280 Specifically, Sanago 
participated in the International Military Education and Training program.281 Of all the 
American military’s training programs, IMET focuses most closely on human rights. The 
fact that Sanago participated in this training for six years and yet still deposed a 
democratically-elected, civilian president demonstrates the failure of human rights 
training within American security assistance. 
  
Failure to Coordinate and Monitor Programs Between Agencies 
These programs suffer from a lack of strategic evaluation of their programs. 
While managers within the programs are supposed to collect and assess data on their 
projects, there is little enforcement of this responsibility. As a result, higher officials do 
not have the information necessary to effectively make budget allocations, performance 
evaluations, and overall operating decisions.282 This has been a problem across the board 
in regional counterterrorism programs. In the Partnership of Regional East African 
Counterterrorism (PREACT), the Bureau of African Affairs has actually presented 
inaccurate information to senior policy officials. In addition, there has not been sufficient 
evaluation of projects to ensure that they are forwarding the program’s objective.283 The 
Government Accountability Office discovered that the Bureau of African Affairs did not 
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have a clear list of which counterterrorism activities PREACT funded.284 With this lack 
of basic monitoring of programs, it is impossible to effectively evaluate and improve 
them. As a result, higher up officials cannot efficiently allocate resources and maximize a 
program’s impact.  
This lack of monitoring and evaluation makes it impossible to analyze which 
programs within these counterterrorism partnerships are having the greatest impact. As a 
result, the budget allocations remain the same, as the importance of individual projects is 
effectively unknown. Budget inequality exacerbates this problem. As USAID receives 
significantly less funding, a project must demonstrate significant success in order to 
receive continuous funding. As managers within these regional counterterrorism 
programs are not effectively evaluating the impact of these programs, they cannot 
evaluate the impact or report on its utility in order to maintain support. 
These interagency programs also fail to outline their strategic goals and timeline 
within their broad strategy documents.285 As a result, each agency generally takes it upon 
itself to outline its own strategic plan. Within these plans, however, the agencies do not 
coordinate with each other. This creates redundancy and miscommunication between 
agencies in the execution of the overall program.286 Given the unique mission of each 
agency, their goals and agendas compete and overlap in many ways. While there have 
been efforts to broadly define the missions of each agency within these initiatives so that 
the agencies complement each other rather than conflict, this is not done within the 
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specific program development of each agency. While the agencies consider each other in 
their broad mission, they do not incorporate the specific plans of other agencies into their 
own strategic planning.287  They also do not coordinate or share resources. In practice, the 
agencies do not even communicate with each other on their funds or the use of said 
funds. As a result, these funds are not used to the maximum utility. While vital programs 
do not receive the funding they need, funds go to waste elsewhere due to failure in 
communication between agencies.288  
 The ultimate goal of these programs is for the aid recipient nations to be able to 
combat terrorism on their own. Ideally, the root causes of terrorism in these nations will 
also have greatly diminished. While these are the broad goals, a lack of coordination of 
short term goals within the American interagency hinders the success of the program as a 
whole. This lack of coordination in combination with the already unequal amounts of 
funding between the Department of Defense, the State Department, and USAID 
undermines humanitarian and diplomatic programs. Given the lack of evaluation of these 
programs, it is impossible to analyze the impact of humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. 
However, in examination of past research on the social, political, and economic roots of 
terrorism, it seems evident that undermining humanitarian and governmental programs 
significantly undermines counterterrorism efforts as a whole.    
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Chapter 4: Recommendations  
To effectively counter terrorism in Mauritania, American agencies must better 
implement human rights programs. This can be completed in the short-term: the 
American government must address the lack of monitoring and evaluation, the unequal 
application of programs, and the overall miscommunication in strategic programming 
within the TSCTP. However, addressing program malfunctions will not be sufficient in 
the long term. The United States government will need to change its paradigm regarding 
the relationship between human rights, development, and security in order to tackle the 
failings of the TSCTP in the long term.  
  
Long Term Solutions to Larger Problems  
The problems in the TSCTP in Mauritania are a manifestation of the greater 
philosophical problem with American security assistance and how it incorporates human 
rights. When the U.S. government sees diplomacy and development through a security 
lens, human rights programs become unsustainable. Congress begins to see USAID and 
State as irrelevant unless the two agencies can prove they are needed within 
counterterrorism and security programs.289 When the U.S. government uses State and 
USAID only to respond to immediate security threats or hands human rights and 
development programs off entirely to the Department of Defense, these programs do not 
tackle the root causes of extremism as they focus on DOD’s security interests. Once the 
United States has addressed the immediate threat, the government generally scales back 
on its human rights and development programs.  
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Instead of implementing human rights and development programs to assist 
security objectives, the U.S. government should view security assistance as creating 
stability and security for the effective implementation of human rights and development 
programs. This would effectively change the paradigm of DOD, State, and USAID to 
focus on long term investments in countries, as they would not expect to quit the country 
after they tackled the immediate security concern. This paradigm shift would also 
automatically make State and USAID more salient in Congressional priorities (assuming 
they also bought into this new outlook). Ideally, once the Congress and American 
policymakers understand human rights and development to be the United States’ primary 
concern in long term stability, they will grant USAID and State significantly more 
funding.290  
 While this shift will take many years to engrain in the entire agency, it can begin 
immediately through better interagency cooperation within the designing of the long term 
strategy for the TSCTP and the actually implementation of the TSCTP. Instead of the 
State Department setting the strategic objectives and the Department of Defense 
implementing the programs independently, DOD, State, and USAID should work 
together on laying out the TSCTP goals broadly, ensuring there is no redundancy or 
contradictions between their programs. The Government Accountability Office has 
recommended that agencies work together to define program objectives, setting clear 
goals so that each agency knows exactly how it fits into the broader 
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program.291Currently, DOD and State conduct their own assessments of country needs 
but do not effectively coordinate their response.292 In order for all agencies to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the situation on the ground, State and DOD personnel 
should conduct country needs assessments together so that both sides understand the full 
scope of problems on the ground. In this way, teams from both agencies would 
understand country needs from security, development, and diplomacy lenses. 
 
Short	  Term	  Solutions	  
 In the short term, there are a few policy changes that the American government 
can make within the execution of the TSCTP to better tackle the root causes of 
extremism. At an interagency level, this requires better monitoring, evaluation, and 
communication between agencies regarding their programs and their use of funds. State 
and USAID human rights programs must also be made mandatory. Finally, DOD must 
take greater ownership of human rights within its programs, emphasizing the importance 
of human rights to local governments and cutting off security assistance if the 
government does not follow through on its human rights obligations. 
 
USAID and the State Department: Greater Monitoring and Evaluation  
The Department of State is in charge of all monitoring and evaluation for its 
programs. However, State does not have an effective monitoring system in place. When 
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the Government Accountability Office requested the data on the allocation of State and 
USAID funds, the two agencies took months to provide a simple breakdown of their 
TSCTP funding.293 When GAO finally received the report, it noted that USAID and State 
had allocated progressively less funding to TSCTP programming each year. USAID and 
State had $288 million allocated to the TSCTP between 2009 and 2013; however, there 
was no clear explanation as to why the funding allocated had decreased each year. As of 
2013, State and USAID had disbursed only around $139 million, indicating that they 
were not getting the maximum utility out of their funding.294 At minimum, having data on 
the available funding through the TSCTP would allow program managers to better 
coordinate “expedited options” for using funds soon to expire.295  
State and USAID have limited funding for all of their programs. In order to have 
the greatest impact, they can only preserve effective programs. Currently, the Department 
of State and USAID do not have monitoring and evaluation processes in place.296 
According to the Government Accountability Office, State currently lacks the manpower 
to establish a monitoring and evaluation system for its TSCTP programs.297 While select 
programs, such as PDEV, implement their own evaluations, these evaluations have not 
sufficiently measured program impact.298 When USAID and State do not know the impact 
of their programs or their spending efficiency, they cannot effectively execute their 
programming. Evaluating the impact of programs allows agencies to establish best 
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practices, decide which programs to maintain, and improve inefficient programs. This is 
not a new problem. In 2011, USAID recognized GAO and other evaluator agencies’ 
recommendations for increased monitoring and evaluation of program impact, 
committing to develop an evaluation process and methodology.299 Nevertheless, in 
GAO’s 2014 report on the TSCTP, the organization still highlighted USAID and State’s 
lack of monitoring and evaluation. While USAID and State are aware of this problem, 
they do not have the manpower to implement a solution.300 
 The solution to this problem is simply to create a staffing position specifically for 
monitoring and evaluation of State and USAID programs.301 In a consultation for State, 
Dexis Consulting Group recommended that State hire additional local staff to implement 
monitoring and evaluation of TSCTP programs in practice.302  Hiring local staff to 
implement monitoring and evaluation in Mauritania would be highly effective, especially 
hiring staff from vulnerable communities. As long as State provided sufficient oversight 
to prevent corruption within the monitoring and evaluation, hiring local staff would 
ensure that State and USAID programs were effectively reaching vulnerable populations. 
This would also give the State Department and USAID another method of listening to 
local opinions of TSCTP programs.  
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Standardized Programming and Funding Streams  
 USAID and the State Department already have difficulty tracking their funding 
and program implementation. This is primarily due to the numerous funding streams, 
specifically the combination of regional and national funding pools.303 This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that TSCTP countries are divided across USAID geographic 
offices. The majority fall under the USAID Bureau for Africa, which is then divided 
further into regional offices, and the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs.304 The 
USAID Bureau for the Middle East and the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern 
Affairs oversees the rest of the TSCTP countries.305  
 To assist in this process, the U.S. government should standardize USAID and 
State programs across TSCTP countries to the greatest extent possible. It is important to 
grant USAID and the State Department maneuverability to allow the agencies to engage 
in long term strategic planning.306 As a result, State Department and USAID funding 
allocations may be most effective if the agencies allocate specific pots of funding for 
programs tackling both short term solutions and long term investments. While there 
should be standard programs implemented across TSCTP countries, USAID and State 
should maintain comprehensive records of all the funding available per country on each 
project. This would make it easier for USAID and State to keep track of funds spent on 
programs and examine which countries need greater support than others.  
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As many of the different funding streams target similar programs and objectives, 
consolidating funding on a country by country basis would allow for a better 
understanding of which programs need greater funding.307 If one program receives 
funding from both Development Assistance and NADR or NADR and Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance (ATA) but another program receives significantly less funding, there should 
be substantial evaluation of this funding misallocation. Ideally, by targeting funding on a 
national basis, it will be easier for USAID and State Department teams to evaluate their 
funding streams and provide feedback on which programs need less or more funding.   
 
Move More Development Programs Away from DOD and back to USAID 
With ideally better funding and at minimum more efficient use of funding, 
USAID should be equipped to take on the development projects that have been put under 
DOD. DOD has taken on an increasingly greater role in development, specifically in 
countries with large counterterrorism assistance programs such as Mauritania.308 It is 
easier for DOD to convince congress for funding for development programs when it is 
justified through security initiatives.309 However, DOD-implemented development 
programs are not sustainable: the Department of Defense seeks short term outcomes that 
will address immediate security crisis rather than focusing on long term investment and 
development.310 While Congress may not approve moving a development program under 
DOD back to USAID, USAID and DOD could work more closely to implement 
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development programs, with USAID acting as the main executor of the program on the 
ground.  
Finding solutions to problems within human rights and development requires 
“non-linear thinking.” The Department of Defense – the U.S. Military – is accustomed to 
tackling problems with linear solutions.311 DOD personnel do not have the appropriate 
skills or training to create development and human rights programs; however, they have 
resources and manpower that USAID and State do not. By working directly together on 
the creation and implementation of human rights and development programs, these 
agencies would increase the impact of these programs. In addition, direct interagency 
cooperation would send the message that the TSCTP is a truly holistic program. This 
would then give the Department of Defense greater credibility when leveraging its 
conventional security assistance for the implementation of human rights programming.  
  
Standard Application and Increased Oversight of Leahy Laws in TSCTP Training 
 The TSCTP should better implement standards for Leahy Law vetting across 
embassies. However, the State Department should not be the sole agency carrying out 
Leahy Law vetting. The Department of Defense should be responsible for the initial 
vetting of military units in training. Having DOD conduct vetting of military units will 
give DOD greater ownership of the human rights elements of its training program. When 
the State Department is the sole agency conducting vetting, human rights vetting appears 
to be a State Department add-on to a DOD program.  
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 In a report for the Congressional Research Service, the author remarked that the 
Leahy Law vetting on DOD programs presents diplomatic challenges and disrupts 
security training programs.312 This notion neglects the importance of emphasizing human 
rights commitments within military-to-military relations. The U.S. Military explaining 
why funds are being withheld will have a greater impact on foreign military behavior 
because another military (rather than civilian) institution is setting an example by 
prioritizing human rights. Currently, American agencies tend to see human rights training 
as State programs integrated into DOD programs.313 This demonstrates that DOD, State, 
and the foreign security forces all also likely see human rights as specifically State-driven 
programming. This is a large problem specifically in countries like Mauritania where the 
government has avoided implementing State and USAID efforts. In order for human 
rights to effectively be implemented within foreign militaries, the U.S. military must take 
ownership of human rights training and vetting.  
 
Tie Security Assistance to Civilian Reforms  
At its core, the TSCTP is a security program. As a result, there has been implicit 
bargaining room with the implementation of USAID and State programs while the 
military training programs remain obligatory. While this is not stated officially, there are 
different precedents in place for conventional security programs within the TSCTP and 
programs falling under development or human rights. A nation wanting to opt-out of the 
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military training would leave the TSCTP. In contrast, a state can opt-out of a USAID or 
State program through negotiation. The TSCTP does not hold governments accountable 
equally across programs. This undermines the TSCTP’s strategic, long term goals, as the 
USAID and State programs target the root causes of extremism in Mauritania and other 
TSCTP nations. By failing to implement these programs but mandating conventional 
security programs, the U.S. government is only tackling the immediate crises and 
symptoms of extremism. Although both civilian and military reforms fall under the 
TSCTP, the United States only uses security assistance to leverage minimal human rights 
reforms within the military. To better integrate human rights into the TSCTP, American 
security assistance must also be conditioned upon human rights and governmental 
reforms broadly. 
The American government should make certain USAID and State programs 
unconditional to correct this imbalance between security, development, and human rights 
agendas. The American government can better enforce the implementation of these 
programs by making conventional security assistance and military training conditional 
upon the implementation of key State and USAID programs. This would also require 
greater cooperation between DOD, State, and USAID to prioritize programming and 
determine a nation’s minimum mandatory requirement for human rights programming in 
order to receive security assistance. For example, the American government could 
obligate Mauritania to accept the USAID PDEV II program in exchange for technology 
and training for the Mauritanian military. The U.S. Military must make clear in its initial 
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provision of aid that the recipient state must also implement mandatory humanitarian and 
development TSCTP programs in order to receive conventional security assistance.314 
 Mandating that groups of Sahelian countries implement similar programs would 
also allow USAID and State to better understand the problems in each country. By 
evaluating the successes and failures of the same program across multiple nations 
suffering similar problems, USAID and State will be able to see the specific factors 
within each issue. For example, implementing the same peace building program in 
Mauritania, Mali, and Niger before the Malian crisis may have allowed the United States 
and the national government to evaluate the social fractures in each country. Potentially, 
a comparison of these programs could have revealed fundamental weaknesses in Mali, 
allowing the government and foreign partners to respond to the needs of the Malians who 
staged the rebellion.  
Moving forward, the United States must change the implementation of the TSCTP 
to be a non-negotiable package. If a government really wants to combat terrorism, it must 
accept the development, anti-corruption, social, and legal reforms that tackle the root 
causes of extremism. If the United States continues to provide security assistance without 
mandating the implementation of core humanitarian and political reforms, it will only 
perpetuate the problem it is trying to solve. In consequence, DOD must buy into the 
promotion of these reforms and condition its security assistance upon their 
implementation.   
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Conclusion 
In combatting terrorism in the Sahel, a strong military is the weakest link in long 
term stabilization efforts, yet it receives the most support and funding from the American 
government. If the United States continues to focus primarily on bolstering Mauritania’s 
military without addressing military abuses, governmental corruption, and systemic 
inequality, American security policy in Mauritania will fail. As has been demonstrated in 
Mali’s recent crisis, the underlying factors of extremism will eventually undermine 
security assistance and even a relatively stable government.  
 To address the factors driving extremism, the American government must better 
include USAID and the State Department within its security assistance. The rigid, linear 
strategy of the Department of Defense and American military cannot effectively tackle 
developmental, economic, and social issues. Instead, DOD must buy into State and 
USAID programs, using DOD security assistance to leverage the implementation of core 
humanitarian and political reforms. Security assistance must be tied to both civil and 
military reforms in order for the TSCTP to be fully effective. 
 In the long term, this will require a full paradigm shift within the American 
government regarding the relationship between human rights and security broadly and 
USAID, State, and DOD specifically. In the short term, the American government can 
begin these reforms in Mauritania through improved interagency cooperation, 
communication, and planning. In addition, it must make specific USAID and State 
programs mandatory. The Mauritanian government should not be able to negotiate its 
way out of core USAID and State programs. Through greater interagency cooperation, 
the U.S. government can effectively pressure Mauritania to reform its corrupt institutions 
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and better respond to human rights abuses in the country. By implementing these 
reforms, the United States will more effectively tackle the root causes of extremism and 
so have a more effective counterterrorism policy overall. 
 In the long term, the United States needs to recognize the importance of 
development and human rights beyond its use in security assistance. Once the United 
States has responded to a security crisis, the government often significantly withdraws its 
assistance to the country. Instead, the U.S. government needs to continuously focus on 
building strong, accountable institutions respectful of human rights and good governance. 
This long term capacity building should also occur in weak states that have not yet faced 
a terrorist threat. The American government should continue to address the underlying 
conditions of extremism even after a security crisis while also combatting these problems 
in weak states where a security threat has yet to manifest. This will make American 
security policy more effective. To do so, the United States must invest more broadly in 
development and human rights, allowing State and USAID to lead (with sufficient 
funding) American policy in states at-risk for the proliferation of VEOs.  
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